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 Abstract 
With the post-Kyoto climate negotiations underway, global emissions must be cut 
by 66% by, 2050 according to the IPCC, to prevent further damage to the 
environment. In order for this emission cut to be possible, all nations have to be a 
part of these negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC is the natural 
starting point for a new climate regime that must be established.  
Through a literature analysis of the International Environmental Politics, 
regarding climate change justice, this essay analyzes how various justice principle 
are being interpreted and used to suggest climate justice solutions to a post-Kyoto 
Protocol. A theoretical analysis of retributive and distributive justice leads the 
way into the actual climate suggestions where these and other forms of justice are 
being applied, directly or indirectly, to post-Kyoto Protocol suggestions. This is 
followed by an analysis of grandfathering, per capita, historical responsibility 
and carbon intensity suggestions.  
The conclusion of this analysis indicates that there is not only one viable 
option but a multitude of options; “hybrid” suggestions standing the best chance 
to unite nations around the world, as they offer something to all parties.  
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In the whole moral sphere . . . there is nothing more 
glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of 
mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of  
interests [societas et communicatio utilitatum] and 
that actual affection which exists between man and 
man . . . [which] is termed Justice. 
Cicero, De Finibus, V. 65 
 
 
In all determinations of morality, this circumstance 
of public utility is ever principally in view; and 
wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or 
common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the 
question cannot, by any means, be decided with 
greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, 
the true interests of mankind. 
Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, 2.17 
 
 1 Introduction 
The areas of sustainability, effectiveness, and justice are classic subjects of 
international environmental politics (IEP). As man made changes to the climate 
have become apparent1, they have, in the last three decades, become increasingly 
interesting, both within the academic community, and the international arena. 
Global warming and climate change have been on the international agenda 
since the 1980s. In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) became part of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, at Rio de Janeiro. After its inaction, in 1994, 
negotiations under the UNFCCC, on legally binding emissions limitations, begun 
and concluded with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol entered into 
force in 2005. It contains emission limitation for Annex I Parties to reduce, on 
average, their emissions by 5 % below the 1990 level. Although small, this is 
widely seen as an important step. 
To comply with the UNFCCC objective--avoiding dangerous climate change-- 
global emissions will have to be reduced by more than 80% for most 
industrialized countries, and by 65% for Sweden, by 2050 if the EU goal of no 
more then +2 degree increase should take place2. As most greenhouse gases 
(GHG) come from the use of fossil fuels in the energy sector, this is a huge 
challenge. Developing countries see demands on emission reductions as limiting 
their possibilities to alleviate poverty and economical growth. 
Is there a way to simultaneously permit sufficient emission reductions and 
provide necessary energy services to support poverty alleviation and economic 
growth? The analytical answer is “yes”3. However, the question is how to 
translate this into action. These actions will need to be resolved by the present 
post-Kyoto regime by the year 2013. 
Albeit, a united scientific front has presented a long string of reports all 
indicating   the seriousness of the situation and the possible effects of continuing 
with “business as usual.” There has, from certain actors, been a curious reluctance 
to accept these findings and to act accordingly. The stated reasons for this 
reluctance are several, and also vary depending on the actors, showing the need 
for further analysis into why and how a possible future might look. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 IPCC. 2007. “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis”. Summary for Policymakers. 
2 Naturvårdsverket. 2004. Rapport – “Post Kyoto”. Page. 8. 
3 UNDP. 2004. “World Energy Assessment 2004 Update”. UNDP. 2000. “World Energy Assessment:  
Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability”. 
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 1.1 The purpose and the issue 
Changes in climate threaten the basic needs of people: access to water, food, 
health, land, and environment, are all in peril. What we decide today, regarding 
climate policy, will effect not only today’s generation, but the obstacles future 
generations will face in the way they live their lives.  Will we act in accordance 
with the WCED recommendation of creating a world that promotes “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs?”4 Or will we continue with “business as 
usual,” thus continuously limiting the future generation’s options and possibilities 
“to meet their needs?” 
The actions of today’s generation can only have a limited effect on the 
changes in climate over the next 40 to 50 years, but what we do in the next 10-20 
years can have a profound impact on the effects of future climate change5.  
This essay will analyse how climate justice has been interpreted in the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol. It will also analyse, noting respective strength 
and weaknesses, how climate justice has been interpreted in the post 2012 Kyoto 
suggestions.   
1.2 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol 
The UNFCCC sets the foundation for present and future climate work.  
 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention…is to achieve, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.” UNFCCC Article 2 – Objective [Emphasis added] 
 
It is important to notice that the UNFCCC allows for continued development, 
thus “caping” of development is not the objective, rather it is to ensure that 
development takes place in a sustainable way.  
With regards to this paper, and its analysis of climate justice, article 3 is of 
particular interest: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 World Commission on Environment and Development anno 1987. Page 43. 
5 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Executive summary page 1. 
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 “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.” UNFCCC Article 3 §1 [Emphasis added] 
 
It is ironic to notice that people, mostly the citizens of developing countries, 
who are the least responsible for the pollution and the current climatic situation, 
are those who will be affected the most. See Appendix I. 
Future solutions should be based on “equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” and that 
the “developed country Parties should take the lead” according to the UNFCCC 
and its signatory parties.  
 
The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and its rulebook 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol shares the Convention’s objective, principles, and 
institutions.  It significantly strengthens the Convention by committing Annex I 
Parties to individual, legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their GHG 
emissions. Until this date 165 countries have ratified the Protocol to date. Of 
these, 35 countries and the EEC are required to reduce GHG emissions below 
levels specified in the treaty. The emission cuts add up to a total cut in GHG 
emissions of at least 5% from 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012. 
Due to the complexity of the negotiations there is “unfinished business,” when the 
Kyoto Protocol was adopted. At that point the mechanisms and compliance 
system had been decided upon, but had not established how they would operate.  
This resulted in that the 84 countries who had signed (not binding) the Protocol 
where reluctant ratify (binding) to do so until these issues had been clarified. Thus 
new negotiations started (at the same time as the UNFCCC convention was being 
negotiated) and culminated at COP 7 with the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords, 
which set out detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005. 
1.3 Method 
This essay is based on an analysis of International Environmental Politics 
literature and relating policy documents. The analysis has a twofold focus: climate 
justice, and post 2012 Kyoto suggestions.  
This essay is based on a case study format. This means that the researcher 
chooses to focus on one specific case, or in this paper, a specific term, namely 
climate justice, without comparing it to other forms of ecological/environmental 
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 justice theories. As with all case studies this leads to the inability to generalize too 
broadly in the conclusions since only one particular case has been analyzed6.  
However, since the purpose of this essay is not to draw conclusions that span 
all or many environmental/ecologica justice theoreis, the author has found this 
focus to be a reasonable concession.  
The advantage with this type of case study format is the ability to show 
emerging patterns, e.g. who stands to gain what from a certain suggestion, and 
what principles of climate justice are involved. It also has the advantage of being 
“open” in the terms that the researcher can change the direction of the essay 
without it having unforeseen consequences7.  
Since justice of the post 2012 suggestions is interpreted in various ways in this 
thesis, both theoretical and also emperical, normative value analysis8 is used to 
pinpoint and define the importance and relation between the various justice terms. 
In the “Suggestions for the way forward” chapter normative, “given that,” 
analysis will be used to illustrate how the different post 2012 suggestions relate to 
justice and potential conflics. “Given that” normative analysis is based on a 
neutral perspective that problematises and critically analyses without taking a 
normative standpoint. It can with advantage9 be used to address questions such as 
“Given that XX is the most important value, what consequences does that entail?” 
(XX representing the desired value to be analysed, for example, intergenerational 
justice, retributive jusitce, etc).  
The various post 2012 suggestions have been collected from books but also 
from reports, for example, the “Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime,”10 
which covers a wide variety of suggestions. See reference list for more details.  
1.4  Delimitations 
Due to time constraints and available material, certain delimitations have taken 
place. 
This is a study of the mitigation suggestions and the climate justice debate 
regarding these issues. Adaptation is also an important area that needs to be 
addressed, but do to time constraints, it has been impossible to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Esaiasson, Peter, et al, 2003. Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. Esaiasson m.fl.  pp.146.
7 Esaiasson, Peter, et al, 2003. Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. Esaiasson m.fl. Pp. 122.
8 Badersten B. 2006. Normativ Metod – Att studera det önskvärda. Page. 43. 
9 Badersten B. 2006. Normativ Metod – Att studera det önskvärda. Page. 44. 
10 Blok. K - Höhne. N – Torvanger A – Janzic. R. 2005. “Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime” 
Final Report 
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 Another limitation is to look at climate change mitigation as a single issue. As 
will be indicated at the end, energy system changes cover other important areas of 
public policy; however, these are considered outside the scope of this thesis. 
This paper also does not try to understand why certain countries pollute more 
than others.  
In the theory chapter certain forms of justice, for example, proportional 
justice, could not be explored due to space constraints and thus had to be shortly 
explained with the suggestion that they are applicable.  
A study comprising both of these aspects, adaptation, and mitigation, would 
be of great interest; however, it is something that is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
1.5 Material 
An example of academic source(s) used - a variety of International 
Environemental Politics (IEP) literature (thus helping to create the justice theory 
framework for the concluding analysis). A nonacademic source used - the original 
text of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cliamte Change 
(UNFCCC). 
A combination of both primary and secondary material has been used: primary 
material in the form of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol; Secondary materials 
consisting of essays, course materials, and subject specific books. All material is 
on an academic level. (See reference list). 
I also feel that the requirement of material review and verification, as stated in 
Metodpraktikan11, where they state that out of a non-tendentious material the 
main arguments can be accepted, has been fulfilled. 
It should be noted that after the four state sponsored suggestions of a post 
2012 protocol, three academic suggestions are reviewed. Since the same critical 
reading and analysis is being applied to all material the author does not feel this 
weakens the analysis. 
Possibly negative for the analysis is that, with the exception of Agarwal and 
Narain, all other authors are from the “North” nations. It would have been 
preferable to have a more balanced literature as that potentially would have 
highlighted factors and aspects that the “Northern” authors might not be aware of.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Esaiasson, Peter, et al, 2003. Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. pp. 314 (table).  
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 1.6 Disposition 
In the next chapter certain key theoretical terms will be defined/analysed  
(Chapter 2). It will also contain the theoretical framework that creates the 
foundation for the different forms of justice . Chapter 3 covers the state sponored 
and non-state (hybrid suggestions) sponsored proposals for the way forward. 
Chapter 4 contains the authors reflections. Concluding remarks follow in chapter 
5.  
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 2 Theory 
This chapter will first briefly define two key concepts to understanding climate 
justice. This will be followed by an analyses on how various justice concepts are 
defined, and how they could be used relating to the climate change debate. 
2.1 Key Concepts 
2.1.1 Defining mitigation vs. adaptation 
There are two ways of approaching how to deal with climate change: mitigation 
or/and adaptation. Albeit this thesis does not cover the mechanics and 
possibilities of adaptation it is important to understand the difference between the 
two, and how they interact with each other. Without this fundamental 
understanding it is impossible to evaluate the respective strength and weaknesses 
with the proposed solutions to climate change.   
Mitigation is defined as any anthropogenic intervention that can either reduce 
the sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (abatement) or enhance their 
sinks (sequestration).12  
Adaptation is defined as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response 
to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be 
distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public 
adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation”.13  
There is a significant difference between adaptation and mitigation. As we can 
see from fig 2.1 (below) adaptation deals with the effects of climate change while 
mitigation addresses the causes of climate change. It is important to notice that 
they both originate from policy responses, but address different responses. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 UNFCC Climate change - Mitigation Assessment 2001. Appendix II: Glossary. 
13IPCC “Climate Change 2001: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”. Annex B: Glossary 
of Terms.  
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Figure 2.1 Source: IPCC 
2.1.2 What constitutes dangerous climate change? 
The range of temperature increase has been a hotly contested subject; however, 
the EU has settled on keeping average global temperature increase below 2oC. 
This translates into stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at 450 ppm CO2e, 
which in turn means that stabilization of CO2 is around 400 ppm. The present CO2 
concentration is 383 ppm and increases by about 3 ppm per year14 15. Thus, 
significant and urgent action is required to insure that the global temperature 
average does not exceed 2oC. For predicted climate changes see Appendix I.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 Naturvårdsverket. 2004. Rapport – “Post Kyoto”. Page. 8. 
15 Personal communications with Thomas B. Johansson, Professor and Director, IIIEE at Lund University. 
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 2.2 Justice 
There are several ways to interpret and define justice and depending on what 
foundational principle is used, different questions gain importance. This chapter 
will explore the difference between retributive and distributive justice in both 
general and climate specific context. The inter/intra-generational debate will also 
be analyzed. As we will see, the climate justice perspective raises some 
fundamental questions concerning the post 2012 Kyoto negotiations. 
2.2.1 Justice in general international relations terms 
In the Anglo American of traditional normative philosophy five main conceptions 
of justice can be seen: utilitarianism, communitarianism, liberal equality, justice 
as meeting needs, and libertarianism16. Despite the fact that the original 
philosophical thoughts interpreted distributive justice as an intrastate justice form, 
the distributive justice argument has been used for interstate justice applications;  
for example distributional justice regarding climate change17. I will briefly18 
explain the main positions of the above listed conceptions of justice before I move 
into the current ongoing debates, namely the distributive and retributive justice 
debates.  
Bentham, Mills, and Hare represented utilitarian justice, which entails that 
whatever will bring the largest amount of people the greatest possible amount of 
happiness is for the benefit of all. This happiness can be achieved through the 
creation of political institutions. Morality is firmly linked utilitarianism, ensuring 
maximal human welfare for the largest possible group19. Critique against the 
utilitarianism came especially from Rawls, Nozick and Williams, who all argued 
that individuals could be sacrificed endlessly for the good of the larger group. The 
utilitarian position is also ethically problematic since it undermines the individual 
and/or group rights by ignoring them, and treats the individual right to choose as 
inviolable20.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 728.  
17 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 728.  
18 This is for two reasons; space constraints and, secondly, that the main focus of the thesis is not on these forms 
of justice. They serve as a precursor to the main analysis involving distributive and retributive justice and the 
climate justice debate. 
19 Ellis, A. 1992. “Utilitarianism and International Ethics”. Page 169.  
20 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 121. 
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 MacIntyre, Sandel and Miller advocated the Communitarian conception of 
justice.  This entailed the differentiation and contextualization of the ‘good’ which 
was needed for the right based justice principle to be efficient.   
Justice in liberal equality terms, or Rawlsian justice with its “veil of 
ignorance,” was developed as a counterpoint to utilitarianism. Rawls, the founder 
of egalitarian justice tradition21, using his famous “Veil of ignorance,” created 
rules for justice:  (i) “Equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties; and (ii) 
that social and economic inequalities are only justified to the extent that they 
benefit everyone, and in particular the least advantage members of society”22. It 
should be noted that Rawls did not apply this to international systems since they 
lack a common political culture23. Despite this, modern commentators argue that 
since certain nations have overused their fair share of the common global 
resources it is reasonable to expect them to compensate those who have negatively 
been affected, either directly, in the form of not having access, or indirectly by the 
need of emission caps due to nations over polluting, by such usage24. 
The meeting of needs justice originates in the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative,25 which argues that justice is a universal value and “bids us to treat 
others as having value in themselves, and to act in accordance with principles that 
are valid for all other actors”26. This has taken on a number of shapes, from the 
Marxist perspective as distribution of social means and burdens - “from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs;”27 to “the moral equality 
of human beings irrespective of their race, creed and nationality28. 
Environmentalists share the Marxist perception, and are supported by the 
language used in the Brundtland Commissions Report, which firmly establishes 
the link between sustainable development, and the needs of citizens in all nations.  
 
“The satisfaction of human needs and aspirations is the major objective of 
sustainable development. The essential needs of vast numbers in the 
developing countries – for food, clothing, shelter, jobs – are not being 
meet, and beyond their basic needs, these people have legitimate 
aspirations for improved quality of life…Sustainable development 
requires meeting basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to 
satisfy their aspirations for a better life.”29
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 Rawls, J. 2007. " Encyclopædia Britannica”.   
22 Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of Justice. Page 14-15. 
23 Rawls, J. 1999. The law of Peoples. Page 24-36. 
24 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 729. 
25 Kant, I. 1785. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Page. 18-22. 
26 Donaldson T. 1992. Kant’s Global Rationalism. Page 137. 
27 Marx, K. 1969. Critique of the Gotha Programme. Part I. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm 
28 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 729. 
29 WCED. 1987. Page 54. 
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 The Brundtland Report is egalitarian in its language because it states that the 
“inequality is the planets’ main environmental problem, and is also its main 
development problem;”30 it is also egalitarian due to the approval of transfer from 
the developed to the developing countries (see quote above)31. One of the 
critiques against a needs based justice approach is the difficulties in defining what 
the needs are for a nation. However, as the quotes above show, there is strong 
argumentation that there are certain basic needs that cannot be denied even by the 
“fiercest critics of justice”32.  
Justice according to libertarian conceptions means that people are entitled to 
their market allocated share without taking into consideration what the needs or 
poverty is of those individuals. Nozick expressed this in his Entitlement theory 
that sets out: 
  
“If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would 
exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings:  
a. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice 
in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
b. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice 
in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the 
holding. 
c. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of (a) and 
(b).”33 
Libertarians argue that the market, as long as it is free is inherently just and 
the outcomes are the result of just individuals dealing with each other on the 
market34 and thus not in need of any outside regulation.  
2.2.2 The inter- and Intragenerational justice debate 
The intergenerational justice principle has its foundation in the Rawlsian theory of 
the “veil of ignorance”35, meaning that behind this veil of ignorance it would be in 
everyone’s interest to create institutions and rules that would involve 
“conservation of options”36 for the future generations. This can be divided into 
three parts of conservation: access, diversity and quality. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
30 WCED. 1987. Page 22. 
31 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 729. 
32 Okereke, C. 2006. “Global environmental sustainability: Intragenerational equity and conceptions of justice 
in multilateral environmental regimes” Page. 729. 
33 Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Page 151. 
34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2007. Distributive justice.  
35 Doyle, M W. “One World, Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples”. Page 
110.
36 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 122.  
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• Access conservation meaning “equitable access to the use and 
benefits of the legacy”.  
• Diversity conservation of the natural and cultural resource base.  
• Quality conservation - leaving the planet no worse off then when 
received.  
 
The intergeneration justice aspect has had a significant impact on the climate 
negotiations and reports; for example, “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs,”37 clearly reflects this way of thinking. 
 Intragenerational justice has received little attention compared to that of 
Intergenerational justice. According to Patterson and Young38 this is due to the 
intergenerational justice aspect which, if taken into consideration, would change 
the balance and power relations between states. From a normative standpoint 
intragenerational justice, if taken seriously, would argue that the emissions would 
have to be cut aggressively, and possibly create an insurance fund that would 
compensate the victims of climate change impacts.  
2.2.3 Justice as adopted by the climate justice debate. 
The climate justice debate is not a direct derivation from the above mentioned 
justice conceptualizations; rather it is an outgrowth from the environmental racism 
movement in the U.S.,39 which quickly grew into environmental justice, and later 
climate justice. This means that in general justice terms, which are used in 
international relations, we can establish the foundation of certain key elements 
that the environmental and climate justice movement have built upon40. Two key 
systems can be distinguished; retributive- and distributive justice41. I will where 
applicable use the Kyoto protocol and the UNFCCC (FCCC) to illustrate these 
forms of justice.  
 
Retributive justice 
Retributive justice entitles the actors that cause the problem, to have the 
responsibility in making amends for it. This principle is largely undisputed on its 
ethical grounds. However, applied to climate justice, it becomes more debated as 
the empirical debates, regarding the climate change causes, are inflicted. The 
retributive justice principle is the foundation for the criminal justice system that 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
37 WCED. 1987. Page 43. 
38 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 122 
39 Parks, B C – Roberts, J T. 2006. “environmental and ecological justice”. Page 329. 
40 Rather they are “hybrid forms” in the sense that they are not “clean” justice approaches.  
41 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 121.  
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 we have today.42 Retributive justice has contributed in three ways to the climate 
justice debate: first, reflected in the “polluter pays” principle; secondly, in the 
“differentiation of responsibilities,” and finally, in raising the question about 
compensation for climate change effects.  
The polluter pays principle has had an impact on both a state and international 
level; states in the form of carbon emissions taxes; international in the form of 
tradable permit systems. In 1997 at the Kyoto negotiations, the negotiators agreed 
on such a system.  There was a common concern (at least on the surface) about 
the economic efficiency and questions of justice. The same concerns formed the 
foundation for the “differentiation of commitment” principle; which in its basic 
form says that developing countries do not have the same duty to cut their 
emissions under the UNFCC. Finally, retributive justice also raises questions 
about compensation. This idea is based on the responsibility-based principle that 
advocates that those who are responsible for a problem should also pay to fix it. 
This principle is advocated by the Alliance of Small States (AOSIS), who 
proposes that compensation should be paid to those who suffer the consequences. 
The Kyoto protocol contains several adaptation cost funds; however, the transfer 
of monetary assets has yet to be effectively distributed43. This argument, so far, 
has been ignored by the richer states, and is only reflected in the FCCC:  
 
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”44
 
The OPEC countries have also raised similar questions of compensation.  
They argue that the cost of implementing the FCCC will be great, thus they 
should be compensated45as their resources would loose value under a strict 
climate mitigation regime. 
 
Distributive justice 
Distributive justice addresses how the costs or benefits of climate change should 
be distributed. Within the distributive justice debate equity has become the 
leading word in the application of distributive justice on climate change; arguing 
that in order for the existing international inequality and injustice to be overcome, 
strong policy responses are needed.46 This is most clearly argued in the general 
political theory literature. The climate change literature, which is by its nature 
more policy oriented, has favoured an “equal per capita emission position as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
42 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 121.  
43 Bruyninckx, H. 2006. “Sustainable development: the institutionalization of a contested policy concept”. Page 
273. 
44 FCCC 1992, Article 4(4).  
45 Roberts, J Timmons  & Parks, Bradley C. A Climate of injustice. Page 181.  
Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 123. 
46 Shue 1999. “Global Environment and International Inequality”. Page: 531-546. 
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 most equitable solution.” However, this literature recognizes the “impossibility” 
of, at least short term, to implement such a solution politically. Climate change 
literature thus advocates an egalitarian position in the sense of “comparable 
burdens.” It should be noted however that this is not a finite solution, rather a 
consequence of practical politics and an egalitarian end goal of equal emissions of 
the “primary implication of justice.” 47
There is, in the climate justice literature, a general consensus on the principle 
that the initial costs should be born by the industrialized countries because of the 
“historical responsibility” they have. This has led to two practical questions, 
which have risen in the negotiations: 1) how to handle the distribution of emission 
reductions, and the costs associated with them; 2) how the transfer of technology 
and economical means from the North to the South should be dealt with.  
 
The first question is reflected in the FCCC Article 3 (1) where it states: 
 
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 
 
This is also reflected in Article 4 of the FCCC where it sets out the various 
obligations between the parties and also the obligation for the developing 
countries to limit their emissions. There is an ongoing debate lead by the 
developing countries and certain commentators.48 Regarding this, Agarwal and 
Narain,49 argue that the long-term emission should be on an equal per capita basis, 
and that it is important to differentiate between “luxury” and “survival” emissions. 
This has largely been rejected by most industrialized countries since it would, in 
their opinion, place an unfair burden on them initially. Thus it has been met by 
commentators as politically unfeasible at the moment. It remains however most 
persuasive on ethical grounds, and has also been recognized by many parties 
(their practical objections remaining). This has lead to a number of studies on how 
the emissions from the industrialized and undeveloped countries could converge 
over time.50  
The second question, the transfer of technology and economic resources from 
North to South in order to assist the developing countries in reducing emissions, 
due to accelerated economic growth, is a justice based argument. The justice 
aspect is derived from the Northern countries since they have caused the climate 
change. The South cooperation “must be conditional on financial and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
47 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 123. 
48 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 124. 
49 Agarwal A & Narain S, Global Warming in an unequal world. 1991 
50 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 124. 
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 technological assistance from the North.”51 This is reflected in Article 4 (7) of the 
FCCC: 
 
“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the 
effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and 
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.” 
 
This Article and principle has been approved in principle by the various 
parties; however, it has not been effective in the amount of real money being 
transferred. However, there has been some progress on the institutional side, 
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, which could, in the 
future, be used to successfully implement the Article.  
2.2.4 Important questions raised in the climate justice debate 
The climate justice debate and literature52 has brought to the forefront some very 
important questions, see below, that have created the foundation for the beginning 
of an equitable and just global climate discussion53.  Listed below are just a few 
of these questions.  
 
• What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global 
warming that is still avoidable? 
• What is a fair allocation of the cost of coping with the social and 
ecological (in turn affecting humans) consequences of the global 
warming that will not, in fact, be avoided?  
• What background allocation of wealth would allow international 
bargaining (about issues 1 & 2) to be a fair process? 
• What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (over the 
long-term and during the transition to the long-term allocation)?54 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
51 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 124. 
52 For example Shue, Paterson, Parks, Roberts. See reference list 
53 Questions paraphrased from Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 120. 
54 Paterson, Matthew, Principles of Justice and Global Climate Change, page 120. Question of list quoted in turn 
from (Shue 1994, 344). 
 15
 2.3 Summary 
Depending on which conceptualization of international justice is used, a variety of 
options can become the foundation for climate justice. The following is a 
summary of some of the options available: 1) A rights-based approach, which 
suggests we have rights to a stable climate55; 2) An approach based on 
responsibility; those causing a problem have a responsibility to resolve it (this can 
be argued either collectively or individually)56; 3) A utilitarian position: we 
should act to maximize overall human welfare, which most commonly will 
involve transferring resources from rich to pour57; 4) A Rawlsian, with its “veil of 
ignorance” position, which specifically suggests that the distributional effects of 
social institutions should benefit the worst off58; 5) The approach of Brian Barry: 
agreements should be negotiated under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, but in order 
to reach agreements that none could reasonably reject. These integrate notions of 
power and of intersubjectivity into the question of justice59.  
Of the two inter-/ intra-generational justice forms intergenerational justice 
have received the most attention and is reflected in the WCED report as it set out 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Intragenerational justice 
has received less attention and this is thought to be the result of the significant 
power shift that would come to be if more focus was on this principle.  
Retributive justice outlines the principle that those who cause a problem have 
the obligation to correct it. This principle has been the foundation for “Polluter 
pays” rationales based either on current emissions or historically accumulated 
contributions to global warming. The “differentiation of responsibilities” and 
compensations for the climate change effects. 
Distributive justice presses for that the burdens and gains of climate change 
should be distributed equally - equality being the key term. Thus highlighting the 
need to recognize the of distributional implications of any climate agreement and 
that all should shoulder a “comparable” burden based on its capacity. 
The climate justice debate has raised some interesting questions both 
regarding the cost and consequences of climate change that should to be addressed 
in the post 2012 negotiations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
55 Sachs, W. 2004. “Climate Change and Human Rights”.  
56 Caney, S. 2005. “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change”. Page. 28. 
57 Postema G J. 2006. “Interests, Universal and Particular: Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory of Value”. Page. 1. 
58 Karlsson, R. 2006. “REDUCING ASYMMETRIES IN INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE - Descent from 
Modernity or Space Industrialization?” Page 234-237. 
59 Karlsson, R. 2006. “REDUCING ASYMMETRIES IN INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE - Descent from 
Modernity or Space Industrialization?” Page 234-237. 
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 3 Proposals for the way forward 
This chapter will analyse four state sponsored suggestions for a post 2012 Kyoto 
protocol that have surfaced during the last dozen year or so, and more importantly 
are discussed in present ongoing negotiations. They all have various consequences 
for climate stabilization, justice, political expediency, and burden sharing (who 
will bear the greatest burden), if they are chosen to act as the guiding principle for 
the new Climate treaty. The state sponsored suggestions are grandfathering, 
carbon intensity, contraction and convergence to a dedicated global per capita 
emission level, and historical responsibility,. Concluding this chapter will be a 
brief analysis of three academic suggestions namely; preference score, the 
Claussen & McNeilly, and, the triptych. 
3.1 State sponsored suggestions 
The suggestions listed here have been advocated by state(s). Each suggestion 
offering their opinion on which is the best way forward, or at the very least which 
are the important aspects that must be included in a post 2012 protocol.  
3.1.1 Grandfathering 
The Kyoto treaty that was established in 1990 was based on the 
“grandfathering”60 concept – “that the worlds wealthier nations would make 
efforts to reduce their carbon emissions relative to a baseline year, in this case, 
1990.”61 Annex I countries committed to reduce their individual emissions, 
averaging 6-7% emission reductions below the 1990 baseline. Simply put 
grandfathering uses historical emission levels to decide how future emission 
levels should distributed (justice) proportionally to current emission levels.  
This form of approach was decided upon due to its political feasibility based 
on a pragmatic principle – if we can find a solution to a problem we are closer to a 
“just solution;” rather then holding on to a more utopian solution that will never 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
60 “In American English, a Grandfather clause is an exception that allows an old rule to continue to apply to 
some existing situations, when a new rule will apply to all future situations. It is often used as a verb: to 
"grandfather" means to grant such an exemption. For example, a "grandfathered power plant" may be exempt 
from tougher pollution laws” Source: Wikipedia 
61 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 139.  
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 take place. Cecilia Albin62 argues that the common denominator in all suggestions 
and solutions (e.g. “common but differentiated responsibilities,” “polluter pays” 
etc.) is in finding solutions that offer everyone something. To illustrate her point, 
Albin uses the example of Finland and Sweden, who could very well have argued 
for reimbursement from the polluting Baltic countries (in accordance with the 
polluter “pays principle”). Instead they financed foreign aid to assist in the 
adaptation to cleaner technology. 
As it stands now, 
grandfathering is not intended to 
apply to developing countries. 
However, there are concerns to 
be raised if this should be the 
guiding principle for a new post 
2012 Kyoto protocol. Aslam 
offers a further explanation, 
“current emissions of developing 
countries, as…are very low 
compared with those of 
industrialized countries, but are 
rising rapidly. This places 
developing countries at a severe 
disadvantage when it comes to 
negotiating emission control 
targets that are based on a 
grandfathering system.”63 64
Fig. 4.1: Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuel Use, 2000 (Source: Boden, 2003)
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As we can see in figure 4.165 
there is a vast gap between 
emission levels. With the latest 
figures available, United States 
is the largest emitter -nearly 
twice as much as China and 
close to four times that of 
Russia.  
The grandfathering principle 
is based on two more forms of 
justice, the first represented 
above by Cecilia Albin.66 
Entitlement theories, both in its 
Marxist and Libertarian form, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
62 As quoted in Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 142 argues this point. 
63 Aslam, M A. Equal per capita entitlements: A Key to Global Participation on Climate Change? Page 2. 
64  Aslam, M A. Equal per capita entitlements: A Key to Global Participation on Climate Change? Page 2. 
65 Figures used with kind permission of J. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks. Calculated on the latest figures 
available by Boden et al. 2003.  
66 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 140.  
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 argues that “individuals are entitled to what they have produced”.67This is clearly 
represented in the grandfathering principle, as every country has an inherited right 
to carbon dioxide emissions.  
Proportional justice is another principle that grandfathering embodies in the 
way nations are different (unequal), thus they should be treated unequally. This 
principle does not, at the moment, affect the developing countries since they are 
not obligated under the current protocol to the 1990 baseline. However, should the 
grandfathering principle be the foundation for a post 2012 Kyoto protocol then 
developing countries, due to their late development, as Aslam explained, would be 
unfairly limited.  
3.1.2 Carbon intensity  
As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush, under pressure to sign the Kyoto 
protocol, promised to do so68. However, once he entered into office his position 
shifted and the U.S. withdrew entirely from the Kyoto protocol. This resulted in a 
massive critique from Europe and environmentalists, forcing the U.S. 
administration to create an alternative plan to address the climate change problem. 
They proposed a “New Approach on Global Climate Change” – outlining how the 
U.S. would measure its progress on reducing emissions. The administration had 
decided that emissions per dollar of GDP would be the best approach.  
 
“The President's Yardstick – Greenhouse Gas Intensity – is a Better Way 
to Measure Progress without Hurting Growth. A goal expressed in terms 
of declining greenhouse gas intensity, measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions relative to economic activity, quantifies our effort to reduce 
emissions through conservation, adoption of cleaner, more efficient, and 
emission-reducing technologies, and sequestration. At the same time, an 
intensity goal accommodates economic growth.”69
 
The roots to this form of thinking can be found in Bentham’s utilitarian theory 
of justice, which argues that “mutually advantageous, and cost effective solutions, 
are just solutions.”70 In climate change policy this implies that the best solutions 
are the ones that maximize both the economic growth and stabilize the climate. 
The best way to ensure this is through the developing countries, since they offer 
the most cost-efficient way to reduce greenhouse gases.  Thus, according to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
67 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 140.  
68 Gore, A. 2006. An Inconvenient Truth 
69 White House, Global Climate Change Policy Book 2002. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html 
70 Postema G J. Interests, Universal and Particular: Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory of Value see also 
Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 143. 
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 U.S., the international effort to stabilize greenhouse gases should focus on the 
developing countries.71  
A positive thing with carbon intensity goals has lead to the understanding and 
focus on finding solutions that will support economic growth while, at the same 
time, protecting the global climate. This idea could be appealing in two ways: 
first, to some developing countries because they feel that “hard caps”72 is the 
equivalent to development caps;  secondly, that it is advantageous to 
industrialized countries since they have a better infrastructure in place to address 
carbon intensity goals, thus they would be more prone to rapid action. Baumert et 
al.73 argues that “early action” is important since “many developing countries 
believe that the industrialized countries lack credibility on the issue of 
international cooperation to curb greenhouse gas emissions, having done little to 
address a problem largely of their own making.”  
There are four immediate downsides of the Bush administration proposal: 1) 
the current stock of emissions are not even touched; 2) the goal of 18% cuts, over 
the next ten years is something that many analysts see as a “freebie” goal since 
reductions of that size are expected to take place, due to the fact that the nations 
efficiency will be improving; 3) the administration does not deal with exported 
emissions, meaning the moving of U.S industries to foreign nations, also called 
“offshoring;” 4) the carbon intensity goal is something that easily becomes a tool 
for political manipulation.74  
Examples of this political manipulation can be seen in the following address, 
given by the Senior Climate Negotiator and Special Representative and Head of 
the U.S. Delegation Harlan L. Watson, in New Delhi at COP-8 in 1998: 
 
“Our choice of approaches to address climate change, if they are to be 
effective in the long run, must recognize that the hope of growth and 
opportunity and prosperity is universal -- that it is the dream and right of 
every society on our globe. And we must also recognize that it would be 
unfair -- indeed, counterproductive -- to condemn developing nations to 
slow growth or no growth by insisting that they take on impractical and 
unrealistic greenhouse gas targets.”75 [emphasis added] 
 
By arguing the way that he does he is ensuring that there will not be any goals 
that would force the U.S. to “really” cut their emissions back to, for example, the 
1990 baseline. Also in 2003, at the Milan negotiations, there were attempts made 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
71 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 143. 
72 Meaning caps on emissions. 
73 As referred to and quoted in Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 143. 
74 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 144. 
75 http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2002/14758.htm Inputs to the Delhi Declaration 
Harlan L. Watson, Remarks to the Eighth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-8) to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change New Delhi, India October 25, 2002 
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 by the U.S. to stop scheduled commitments on emissions by trying to form a 
coalition with China and the G-77 on developing countries.76  
It should be noted that the U.S. also has advocated that large polluting 
countries such as China, India and Brazil also must be included in the upcoming 
negotiations since they will soon pass the U.S. in total emissions.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
76 Financial Times, Only new technology can halt climate change by Undersecretary of State Paula Dobrinsky. 
http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?id=031130002709&query=Only+ 
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 3.1.3 Per capita emissions allowances  
In a combined suggestion by India, China, and the G-77, per capita emissions, 
also known as contraction and convergence, is based on an egalitarian principle of 
equality (justice). This principle is based on equal human value and rights.  This 
means that we, as humans, have an equal right to the earth’s atmosphere; 
implicitly meaning that everyone has the right to an equal allocation of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
This suggestion has gained support by India, China, G-77, France, 
Switzerland, and the European Union.77 There are many who support this 
principle; amongst those is Michael Grubb, an economist at the Cambridge 
University, who refers to it as: 
 
“The most politically prominent contender for any specific global formula 
for long-term allocations with increasing numbers adherents in both 
developed and developing countries.”78
 
The per capita suggestion creates a pressure on the developed countries as 
they exceed the stabilization target, or roughly 1 metric ton of carbon equivalent 
(Ce) per capita, if 1990 is used as baseline year (see fig 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order for a successful per capita based principle system, the parties would 
first have to establish a “global emission budget,” meaning how much society can 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
77 According to Baumont 2002 (as referred to in Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 284.) there 
are several other countries that can accept the per capita principle should it be integrated a larger system. I.e. a 
multicultural, menu system. 
78 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 144. 
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 pollute to reach a set goal (scientific consensus currently recommends that the 
carbon dioxide emission stabilization goal should be approximately 400 parts per 
million (ppm).79 These levels will most likely be adjusted with the upcoming 
IPCC fourth Assessment Report. 
The idea of this principle is that once the allocation of the “global emission 
budget” is finished and agreed upon, every citizen80 would be given his/her share. 
This means that the richer countries, which pollute a great deal more than their 
allotted emission “budget” would allow, would have to “contract” their emissions 
over time to meet the quota of approximately 1 metric ton of CO2e. For most of 
the developing countries it would mean the opposite-they would be allowed to 
initially increase their emissions, and then gradually “converge” them at the 1 
metric ton CO2e81. Part of this suggestion is that countries that could, and were 
willing to stay below their levels, trade their permits to other countries in 
exchange for funding or technology assistance through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) or other possible trading mechanisms.  
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79 IPCC have calculated several scenarios for possible outcomes of various carbon dioxide (ppm) levels. See 
chapter 6 for an figure regarding implications of various levels.  
80 Note that it is the same for all citizens regardless of nation, e.g. the same for a U.S. citizen as an Ethiopian 
citizen.  
81 These calculations are based on a global population of 9 billion. 3GtC by 2050 corresponds to 300kgC per 
capita. Source: Personal communications with Thomas B. Johansson, Professor and Director, IIIEE at Lund 
University. 
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Figure 3.1.4. Diagram showing the number of citizens per nation emitting as much as one U.S.  
citizen. Source: Calculated From Boden Et Al. 2003.  Includes fossil fuel use carbon dioxide only.
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 here is critique against the per capita suggestion, due to the fact that many 
analysts find it politically enviable and economically ineffective. It is important to 
understand how far apart the various citizens are in terms of per capita emissions. 
As shown in fig. 4.2 twenty percent of the world’s high-income countries emit 
63% of the global emissions while the poorest twenty percent only emits 3%. The 
inequalities become even more apparent when we look at diagram 3.1.4 (above) 
and see the startling differences (i.e. one U.S. citizen emits more the 540 
Ethiopians)! See Appendix II for a more detailed list Table 3.1.4. 
3.1.4  Historical responsibility   
This is based on the polluter pays principle which has been a central concept to 
climate justice for more then 30 years (i.e. it was endorsed by the OECD in 
1974).82 This proposal was created by the Brazilian scientists and government 
experts who address climate change on this principle only. Carbon dioxide stays 
in the atmosphere between 100-120 years while methane gas remains for 
approximately 12 years.83 Thus, it is important to account not only for the present 
emissions but also for the past emissions, since they are still affecting us and will 
continue to do so for a long period of time. It is irrelevant that countries were not 
aware of the negative consequences for the environment since they gained 
advantage of emitting greenhouse gases.  
This suggestion has some drastic political implications since the emission 
from the early industrialization, around 1945 and forward, is still in the 
atmosphere affecting us. Calculations have shown that Britain by 2010 would 
have to cut their emissions by 66%, United States by 23%, and Japan 8%.84    
Since the developing countries have contributed in such a small amount to the 
current stock of emissions, they are strong advocates of this suggestion. The G-77, 
at the South Summit in Havana in 2000 stated: 
 
“We believe that the prevailing modes of production and consumption in 
the industrialized countries are unsustainable and should be changed, for 
they threaten the very survival of the planet…. We advocate a solution for 
the serious global, regional and local environmental problems facing 
humanity, based on the recognition of the North’s ecological debt and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the developed 
and developing countries.”85
                                                                                                                                                        
 
82 OECD: The Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle Recommendation adopted on 14th November, 
1974) C(74)223 “REAFFIRMS that: The Polluter-Pays Principle constitutes for Member countries a 
fundamental principle or allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures introduced by the public 
authorities in Member countries;” 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/texts/oecd/OECD-4.09.html 
83 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 146. 
84 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 146. 
85 Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit held in Havana from 10 to 14 April 2000. Article 44 & 45. 
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Since the historical responsibility model is fairly complex, with regards to its 
calculations, it has had a hard time gaining attention and traction. The IPCC found 
that calculating past pollution emissions “supply a reasonable ‘proxy’ for the 
relative contribution to global warming.”86 In figure 3.1.4 we can see a summary 
of all the industrial emissions, from 1950-1999, measured in four ways. The 
summary of emissions shows that the high-income nations emit twice as much as 
the middle-income countries and, cumulatively, four times as much as those who 
live in the poorest of countries, where the majority of the Earths population live. 
The “polluter pays” principle demonstrates the retributive justice concept of 
climate justice.  
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Figure 3.1.4. Source: Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Used with the author’s permission. 
Parenthesis contains the number of countries in the category. 
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 3.2 Non-state sponsored proposals for the way 
forward 
In the previous chapter we analysed four possible suggestions that could act as a 
foundation for a post 2012 Kyoto protocol. Each of the four suggestions; 
grandfathering, carbon intensity goals, per capita, and historical responsibility, 
have their own guiding justice principle. Each also have their own pros and cons. 
In figure 3.2.1 where we can see where the suggestions have originated from and 
who is supporting them, primarily. As we have been able to see there are 
significant differences in how climate justice should be interpreted by the various 
nations. This implies that the likelihood of all nations embracing one of the 
previous suggestions seems highly unlikely. 
 This chapter will discuss a possible way forward – a hybrid proposal – a hybrid 
justice model. These suggestions have been produced within the academic 
community87 and illustrate examples of possible solutions that offer compromises, 
on both moral and climate justice grounds, and alternative ways forward.  
If we study Fig 3.2.1 we can see that the guiding principles are very different 
for the North-South, thus the likelihood that they will all combine under one of 
the covered proposals in this paper seems highly unlikely, and pushing one or the 
other will more the likely result in a complete stalemate.88 What is needed is a 
compromise; a compromise that is built on a justice and moral foundation, but 
also takes into account the various real political, national, international and 
economical situations. However, it might become impossible to find one model  
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88 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 150. 
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 that combines all climate justice aspects since 
there are so many, in light of this hybrid models 
have been suggested. This chapter will discuss 
some of these hybrid proposals. These are a 
selection of the multitude of examples of 
possible solutions that, I find, offer some of the 
most interesting “hybrid solution” proposals. 
3.2.1 Preference score 
Bartsch and Müller89 have presented a method 
that combines grandfathering and a per capita 
approach by a voting system90. Thus combining 
distributive justice with a human value and 
rights based approach and democratic voting 
principles.  
In their proposal each country, weighted by 
population, is allowed to decide what model 
they want. The appeal of this model lies in the 
fact that it can combine various moral, ethical, 
and justice related questions – that sometimes 
can be ambiguous when put against each other – 
and give options for possible ways to look at 
climate change. 
The citizens of all nations would vote on 
their preferred emission plan and then the votes 
would be combined and used to calculate the 
national carbon emission allowance. According 
to their preliminary calculations 75% would 
vote for a per capita system and 25% for 
grandfathering91.  
In the figure to the right are the results displayed for three different scenarios. 
Due to space limitations and complexity the full model cannot be described here, 
rather briefly illustrated92. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
89 Muller B. Compromise in a Morally Complex World: The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits 
Between industrialized and Developing Countries . Page. 10. See also Parks & Roberts. 
90 Muller, B. 2002. “Where justice and realism meet: a climate change solution?” 
91 Muller B. Compromise in a Morally Complex World: The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits 
Between industrialized and Developing Countries . Page. 10. 
92 For a deeper review and explanation see CNRS/LEPII-EPE, RIVM/MNP, ICCS-NTUA, CES-KUL.  
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PATHWAYS IN THE UNFCCC PROCESS UP TO 2025 − 
POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY . Page 15.  Also Muller, B. Fair Compromise in a Morally Complex World: The 
Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits Between industrialized and Developing Countries. Page 10 and 
forward.  
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 3.2.2 Pew Center for Global Climate Change 
At the Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Eileen Claussen and Lisa 
McNeilly have developed a suggestion that uses the Kyoto protocol and the 
UNFCCC as its frame. They suggest three criteria: responsibility for emissions, 
standard of living, and opportunity to reduce emissions.93 Using these criteria’s it 
is possible to establish the obligations for each nation. The nations would be 
separated into three categories; “must act now,” “those that should act now,” and 
“those that should act now if feasible.”94 Division into the three groups would be 
done according to the following premises95: 
 
? “Must act now”-Countries who score high on both 
responsibility and standard of living factors will be placed in 
this group. 
? “Should act now, but differently” – Countries who score high 
on some factors but low on some will be placed in this 
category. 
? “Could act now”– Countries who score low on at least two of 
the factors. 
 
There are several advantages with this approach; it is multilevel, it takes 
multiple sectors into account, it and allows for national circumstances. The 
leadership under this suggestion should come from the “must act now” group. Not 
only is leadership required but it would also mean that the least developed 
countries could see that the countries most responsible for climate change are 
shouldering their responsibility and acting accordingly. This group would contain 
mostly Annex I countries and all actions would “be in line with its relative 
national circumstances”96. 
The “should act now group”, mostly developing countries, would 
internationally negotiate goals where equity would be balanced against other 
national and international goals. Depending on which of the sectors they scored 
high in they could be asked to meet goals within that sector. For example, a 
country with a high responsibility score could be asked to make rapid near-term 
reductions in emissions, while a country that scored high on the standard sector 
might be asked to finance mitigations costs.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
93 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page ii.
94 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page ii.
95 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page 2.
96 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page 21.
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 The third group, the “could act now”, are all developing countries which have 
“extremely low national incomes, low emissions both historically and for the 
predictable future, and, consequently, relatively few opportunities to reduce 
emissions”97. These countries would be under no obligations to cut any emissions 
initially. They should however act to reduce their use of carbon intensity energy 
sources and increase the efficiency of end use.  
3.2.3 Triptych 
This approach is built on ways “to allocate national targets based on sectoral 
considerations”98. From the beginning the Triptych approach covered three 
sectors; heavy industry, power, and domestic. The Triptych approach now also 
includes emissions as a result of use of “industry, agriculture, waste, and land-use 
change and forestry”99. The triptych approach then measures each sector 
differently: 
 
? Industry sector – Carbon intensity approach where growth, in 
the physical production is expected but also constant 
improvement in efficiency. 
? Electricity production sector – decarbonisation targets where 
growth, in the physical production, is expected but also 
constant improvement in efficiency. 
? Domestic sector – a convergence on per capita emissions. 
 
Each nation, on an individual basis, is allowed a certain amount of emission 
based on their unique circumstances, however they are allowed to distribute their 
emissions by sector as they chooses, thus enabling each nation “the flexibility to 
pursue any cost-effective emission reduction strategy”100. As we can see the 
Triptych approach uses several of the earlier mentioned ways of measuring 
emissions and suggestions for solutions, thus offering something to several 
parties.  
The downside is the complexity of the approach since individual information 
would have to be gathered sector by sector and then emission goals would have to 
be negotiated101.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
97 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page 22.  
98 Blok, K et al. Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime Final Report”.  Page 44.“
99 Blok, K et al. Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime Final Report”.  Page 44.“
100 Blok, K et al. Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime Final Report”.  Page 44.“
101 Blok, K et al. Towards a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime Final Report”.  Page 44. “
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 3.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have seen four state sponsored suggestions; grandfathering, 
carbon intensity, per capita and historical responsibility. Each of these state 
sponsored suggestions uses various climate justice conceptions, either directly or 
indirectly, in the way they feel justice should be applied to the ongoing post 2012 
negotiations. Their conceptions of justice are often directly in conflict with each 
other. In an attempt to address these conflicts hybrid suggestions have been 
suggested from the academic community. The preference score, the Pew Center 
and the Triptych suggestion have been reviewed to illustrate potential 
compromises and, possibly, the way forward. In the following chapter the author 
will discuss other issues besides climate justice and the related suggestions, that 
he feels will play an important part in the ongoing and future discussions and 
negotiations for a future climate regime. 
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 4 Reflections 
 
Having reviewed and analysed a wide variety of literature on IEP102, I have come 
to realize that in order for a future solution to work there are other important 
factors to take into account besides questions of jusitce. Since the scope, as set out 
in purpose and the issue (chapter 1.1), I have decided to keep the analysis as 
focused as possible on those issues and will here share other important insights 
pertaining to the possible success of any future climate regime.  
One is that there has to be a general trust between developed and undeveloped 
countries.  This is one of the keystones missing in today’s climate negotiations. 
This trust, or social capital as it is also referred to, affects all social interactions, 
both on an individual and national level, thus climate negotiations are affected as 
well. It is argued that for any negotiation or discussion to be truly successful there 
hast to exist a trust between the parties present. This social capital includes the 
parties sharing their true intentions and thoughts, and not using rhetorical 
manoeuvres to hide their true positions. However, if the parties assume some sort 
of falsehood, lack of respect and superiority from other parties (unequal human 
value and rights) will be unreceptible to factual reasoning, objectively analyzing 
and seeing “points” with other party’s suggestions. If the aforementioned occurs, 
it will be meaningless to try to create a framework for further negotiations103. 
The connections and relations between climate change and other important 
questions must be more recognized. Understanding these factors would entitle us 
to more clearly understand the possibilities and limitations for a future climate 
regime. These factors include economic growth, trade, debt, poverty reduction, 
energy supply safety, peace, environmental degradation,104 etc. All these are 
interconnected, thus effecting the climate change negotiations.  
There are suggestions to solutions in other areas of IEP, which take many of 
these factors into account. The World Energy Assessment 2004 Update105 is one 
example of a cross question report. It shows that solutions exists which take into 
account multiple factors and show the possibility of such solutions. More studies 
are needed that look at climate change and its interactions with other important 
factors, and if solutions can be created that assists nations in domestic problems, 
e.g. poverty etc. In fact, energy system changes on the ground of national 
environment, security, and growth concerns could also deliver mitigation as a by-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
102 See reference list. 
103 Rothstein B.  Sociala fällor och tillitens problem. Page 292. 
104 Roberts T & Parks, B, A climate of injustice. Page 150. 
105 UNDP. 2004. “World Energy Assessment Overview:  2004 Update”  
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 product. This suggest that a broader, multi-objective approach would be of a 
possible interest 106.  
Due to the many changes in available information, political situation and 
current climate change, is at this point, impossible to recommend one of the 
before analysed suggestions as being the “right” one. It can be argued that the 
hybrid suggestions are the most appealing, since any future climate regime would 
have to appeal to as many nations as possible.  The hybrid suggestions appear to 
do this. It is only then that true change can occur. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
106 Personal communications with Thomas B. Johansson, Professor and Director, IIIEE at Lund University. 
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 5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has shown that climate justice is an important concept that has much to 
offer in way of the post-2012 negotiations. 
A successful new climate regime entitles more then just a new protocol. If the 
negotiations are unfair or unequal, factual or perceived, then the implementation 
of the protocol will not be pursued to the fullest107. This means that anything but 
the fullest possible implementation of climate mitigating solutions becomes unfair 
to those, mostly in the developing countries, who will have to take the brunt of the 
climate change effects.  
This analysis has shown many ways one can look at justice and inequality, e.g. 
rights, causality and responsibility, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, Rawlsian 
justice, and impartiality principles. The definitions of these and the suggested 
implementations of them have pros and cons. Depending on what form of justice 
is chosen to act as a guiding principle, the outcome will become very different and 
conflicts will arise. Hybrid suggestions attempt to address these differences. 
However, after analysing the aforementioned, I believe it is foremost imperative 
that all international negotiations should be founded on equality and justice based 
principles. This is the only way that the North-South gap, i.e. inequality, distrust 
etc, can be bridged.  
The analysis presented in this thesis provides the beginning of an answer to 
the complexities of climate justice and equality that needs to be addressed in the 
post-Kyoto negotiations. These issues obviously require a greater detailed analysis 
than has been possible to present in this thesis. It is my hope however, that I have 
been able to provide a glimpse into the complexities surrounding the ongoing post 
2012 climate change negotiations and the error of approaching it as just a question 
of climate justice without taking into considerations the aforementioned factors. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
107 Claussen, E – McNeilly, L. 1998. “The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Equity & Global climate 
change”. Page 23.
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 6 Appendix  
6.1 Predicted climate changes 
Due to the very nature of our environment the inertia in climate system will lead 
to that changes will not occur overnight but rather spread out over a long period of 
time. It is important to notice that this does not mean that the effects will not be as 
severe, it just means that 
time will go between our 
actions and the effects of 
them.  
As the glaciers melt there 
will an initial increase of 
water supply, but will 
lead to severe reduction 
in availability 
compromising over one 
sixth of the worlds 
population, mostly in 
parts of India, China and 
the Andes in South 
America. 
Declining crops, 
mostly in Africa, could 
lead to that hundreds of 
millions of people are 
left without the 
capability to grow the 
crops they need to 
survive or to purchase 
food. Initially there will 
be an increase in crops in 
mid to high latitudes as 
the temperature 
increased +2-3º C but 
that will diminish as 
temperature continued to 
increase. At a +4º C 
 
 
Fig.  7.1 Source: Stern Report on the economics of climate change. 
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 increase and beyond the global food production will probably be seriously 
affected.  
At higher latitudes there will be a decrease in deaths caused by cold weather. 
On a global scale however there will be an increase in deaths related to 
malnutrition and heat stress. There will also be an increase in vector-borne 
diseases such as dengue fever and malaria which could also become more spread 
if precautions are not taken. 
 As temperatures increase 3-4º C the sea-level will also go up displacing 
anything from tens to hundreds of millions of people. This will affect areas such 
as Bangladesh and Vietnam, the Island states of the Pacific and also the large 
costal cities of New York, London, Cairo and Tokyo. One estimate indicates that 
more then 200 million people will become permanently displaced. 
With a 2º C increase in temperature ecosystems around the world will face 
challenges with approximately 15% - 40% of species facing extinction.  
Marine ecosystems, including fish stocks, will be affected as ocean 
acidification will increase as the CO2 in the atmosphere increases.  
There is another group of possible effects that can occur due to climate 
change. Warming can also lead to that the sudden shift and changes can occur in 
climate events such as the El Niño and the monsoon rains in South Asia. These 
changes can bring with them consequences for the people living in the affected 
areas, especially with regards to water availability and can threaten the livelihood 
of millions of people. See Fig. 7.1 for an overview of possible climate changes. 
There are several studies concerning possible effects on the Amazon that 
suggest that it can be vulnerable to climate change. Damages can occur at a 2-3º C 
increase of temperature and potentially be irrevocable.  
One in twenty persons will be affected by the melting ice sheets as water 
levels would rise to threaten their land.  
There are many risks that we know little or nothing about, there are 
possibilities that human enterprise could take the global climate into new and 
hitherto uncharted ranges, far beyond the human experience, where life as we 
know it might not be able to function.  
It is important to realize that these climate changes will not occur evenly 
distributed. It is those with the fewest resources and options available to them that 
will be affected the most.  
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 6.2 Charts and Diagrams 
 
Source: UN Statistical Division/CDIAC 
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 Table 3.1.4: Number Of Citizens Emitting As Much Carbon Dioxide As 
One U.S. Citizen. Source: Calculated From Boden Et Al. 2003.  Includes fossil fuel 
use carbon dioxide only. 
 
Thirty Nations Where One Average U.S. 
Citizen Emits The Same Amount of Carbon 
As Over 100 Average Citizens: 
 Ethiopia (>540 citizens=one American), Chad 
(>540), Zaire (540), Afghanistan (540), ), Mali 
(540), Cambodia (540), Burundi (540), Uganda 
(270), Mozambique (270), Burkina Faso (270), 
Malawi (270), Rwanda (270), Lao (270), 
Central Afr Rep (270), Tanzania (180), Niger 
(180), Comoros (180), Nepal (135), 
Madagascar (135), Guinea (135), Sierra Leone 
(135), Liberia (135), Myanmar (108), Sudan 
(108), Zambia (108), Haiti (108), Eritrea (108), 
Bhutan (108), Gambia (108) 
36 Additional Nations Where One Average U.S. Citizen 
Emits the Same Amount of Carbon As Over 5 Average 
Citizens: 
Ecuador (9.8), Guyana (9.5), Grenada (9.5), China (9), Egypt 
(8.8), Puerto Rico (8.9), Panama (8.9), St. Lucia (8.7), 
Botswana (8.4), Fr Polynesia (8.4), Br Virg Is (8.2), Latvia 
(8.1), Mauritius (8.1), St Helena (8.1), St. Kitts-Nevis (7.8), 
Cuba (7.2), Seychelles (7.1), Gabon (6.8), Algeria (6.8), Dom 
Republic (6.7), Belize (6.4), Jordan (6.3), Mongolia (6.3), 
Thailand (6.2), Lithuania (6.2), Iraq (5.9), Syria (5.9), Reunion 
(5.9), Turkey (5.8), Azerbaijan (5.5), Argentina (5.3), Macau 
(5.3), Romania (5.1), Guadeloupe (5.1), Chile (5.0), 
Yugoslavia (5.0) 
37 Additional Nations Where One Average 
U.S. Citizen Emits the Same Amount of 
Carbon As Over 20 Average Citizens: 
Bangladesh (90), Guinea Bissau (90), Benin 
(77.14285714), Kenya (67.5), Kiribati (67.5), 
Nigeria (60), Ghana (60), Cape Verde (60), 
Solomon Is (54), Togo (49.1), Swaziland 
(49.1), Vanuatu (49.1), Cameroon (45), Senegal 
(45), Eq Guinea (45), Yemen (41.5), Angola 
(41.5), Sri Lanka (38.6), Papua New Guinea 
(38.6), Congo (33.8), Cote D'ivoire (31.8), 
Djibouti (31.8), Tajikistan (30), Paraguay (30), 
Sao Tome And Principe (30), Viet Nam (27), 
Honduras (27), Nicaragua (27), Pakistan (25.7), 
Samoa (24.5), Guatemala (22.5), Fiji (22.5), 
Armenia (21.6), Albania (21.6), Kyrgyzstan 
(20.8), W Sahara (20.8), Namibia (20) 
25 Additional Nations Where One Average U.S. Citizen 
Emits the Same Amount of Carbon As Over 3 Average 
Citizens: 
Jamaica (4.8), Am Samoa (4.7), Lebanon (4.6), Mexico (4.5), 
Barbados (4.5), Croatia (4.4), Uzbekistan (4.1), Bosnia-
Herzegovinia (4.1), Iran (4.1), Hong Kong (4.1), Suriname 
(4.1), Sweden (3.75), Bulgaria (3.7), Switzerland (3.7), 
Hungary (3.7), Martinique (3.7), Antigua And Barbuda (3.6), 
Macedonia (3.6), French Guiana (3.6), Belarus (3.4), Bahamas 
(3.3), Portugal (3.3), France (3.2), Malaysia (3.2), Venezuela 
(3.0), Slovakia (3.0) 
22 Additional Nations Where One Average 
U.S. Citizen Emits the Same Amount of 
Carbon As Over 10 Average Citizens: 
Philippines (19.3), India (18.6), El Salvador 
(18.6), Peru (17.4), Mauritania (17.4), 
Zimbabwe (16.9), Georgia (16.875), Tonga 
(16.4), Indonesia (15.4), Morocco (15.4), 
Bolivia (15), Colombia (14.2), Dominica 
(14.2), Costa Rica (13.8), St Vincent And Gren 
(13.2), Cook Is (12.85714286), Niue (12.9), 
Uruguay (12.3), Moldova (11.0), Brazil (10.8), 
Maldives (10.8), Tunisia (10.2) 
30 Additional Nations Where One Average U.S. 
citizen Emits the Same Amount of Carbon As 
Over 2 Average Citizens: 
Ukraine (2.9), Spain (2.8), Malta (2.8), Turkmenistan (2.7), 
Slovenia (2.7), Bermuda (2.7), Italy (2.7), South Africa (2.6), 
Austria (2.6), Cayman (2.6), Iceland (2.6), Poland (2.5), St 
Pierre And Miq (2.5), New Caladonia (2.5), Gibraltar (2.5), 
Kazakhstan (2.4), Oman (2.4), Denmark (2.4), New Zealand 
(2.4), North Korea (2.4), Cyprus (2.3), Netherlands (2.3), 
Greece (2.2), Rep. Korea (2.2), Japan (2.1), United Kingdom 
(2.1), Germany (2.1), Taiwan (2.0), Montserrat (2.0), Russia 
(2.0) 
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Source: Human Development Report 2001, United Nations Development Programme. 
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 7 Glossary and Abbreviations 
Annex I Parties.  The industrialized and transitioning countries listed in this Annex to the 
Climate Convention. These countries accepted emission targets 
for the period 2008 to 2012 in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Annex II Parties.  The wealthy countries listed in this Annex to the Climate 
Convention that have a special obligation to help developing countries 
withfinancial and technological resources. They include the 24 original 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) plus the European Union. 
Annex B.  An Annex to the Kyoto Protocol that lists agreed emission targets 
taken by the industrialized and transitioning countries for the so-called 
first commitment period, which runs from 2008 to 2012. 
AOSIS.   Alliance of Small Island States. An ad hoc coalition of 42 low-lying 
and island countries that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and 
sharecommon positions on climate change. 
BAU.  Business as usual. A scenario that represents the most plausible 
projection of the future. BAU embodies the notion of what would 
happen, hypothetically, if climate-friendly actions were not taken. 
CDF.   Clean Development Fund. An element of the original Brazilian Proposal 
that was adapted to become the Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
CDM.   Clean Development Mechanism. A project-based emissions trading 
system under the Kyoto Protocol that allows industrialized countries to 
use emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries that 
both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote sustainable 
development. Climate Convention. See UNFCCC. 
COP.   Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention. The supreme body 
of the Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention’s progress. The word “conference” is not used here in the 
sense of “meeting” but rather of “association,” which explains the 
seemingly redundant expression “fourth session of the Conference of the 
Parties.” 
COP/MOP.  Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol’s supreme body, which will serve as 
the Protocol’s meeting of the Parties. The sessions of the COP and the 
COP/MOP will be held during the same period. This will improve cost-
effectiveness and coordination with the Convention. 
CO2.   Carbon dioxide, a naturally occurring gas. It is also a by-product of 
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 burning fossil fuels and biomass and other industrial processes as well as 
land use changes. CO2 is the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
affecting the Earth’s temperature. 
EU.  European Union.  
GDP.   Gross domestic product. The total value of goods and services produced 
by an economy. 
Global Warming  
Potential (GWP).  An index that allows for comparison of the various greenhouse gases. It 
is the radiative forcing that results from the addition of 1 kilogram of a 
gas to the atmosphere compared to an equal mass of carbon dioxide. 
Over 100 years, methane has a GWP of 21 and nitrous oxide of 310. 
Greenhouse Effect.  The effect produced as greenhouse gases allow incoming solar radiation 
to pass through the Earth’s atmosphere but prevent most of the outgoing 
long-wave infrared radiation from the surface and lower atmosphere 
from escaping into outer space. This envelope of heat-trapping gases 
keeps the Earth about 30° C warmer than if these gases did not exist. 
GHG.  Greenhouse gas. Any gas that absorbs and re-emits infrared radiation into 
the atmosphere. The main greenhouse gases include water vapor (H2O), 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). 
G-77.   Group of 77. Founded in 1967 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD); seeks to harmonize 
the negotiating positions of its 133 developing-country members. 
IMF.  International Monetary Fund. An international organization of 184 
member countries established to promote international monetary 
cooperation and foster economic growth. 
IPCC.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. An organization 
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the 
United Nations Environment Programme. It conducts rigorous surveys of 
the worldwide technical and scientific literature and publishes 
assessment reports widely recognized as the most credible existing 
sources on climate change. Kyoto Protocol. An international agreement 
adopted by all Parties to the Climate Convention in Kyoto, Japan, in 
December 1997. 
LDC.   Least developed country. A category of countries (currently 49) deemed 
by the United Nations to be structurally handicapped in their 
development process, facing more than other developing countries the 
risk of failing to come out of poverty as a result of these handicaps, and 
in need of the highest degree of consideration from the international 
community in support of their development efforts. 
OECD. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. An 
international organization consisting of the major industrialized 
countries. The includes Mexico and the Republic of Korea, which are 
non-Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol.  
OPEC.  Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries  
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 Party. A state  (or regional economic integration organization, such as the European 
Union) that agrees to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has 
entered into force. 
S-CDM.  Sector-Based Clean Development Mechanism. An approach to 
expanding the Clean Development Mechanism to encompass entire 
sectors, geographic regions, and combinations of sectors and regions.  
SD-PAMs.  Sustainable Development Policies and Measures. An approach to climate 
protection that builds on sustainable development priorities.  
UNFCCC.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate 
Convention, or Convention). A treaty signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro by more than 150 countries. 
WCED.  World Commission on Environment and Development 
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